From injustice to action: The role of empathy and perceived fairness to address inequality via victim compensation by Urbanska, K. et al.
This is a repository copy of From injustice to action: The role of empathy and perceived 
fairness to address inequality via victim compensation.




Urbanska, K. orcid.org/0000-0001-5063-4747, McKeown, S. and Taylor, L.K. (2019) From 
injustice to action: The role of empathy and perceived fairness to address inequality via 
victim compensation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 82. pp. 129-140. ISSN 
0022-1031 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2019.01.010





This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 
(CC BY-NC-ND) licence. This licence only allows you to download this work and share it with others as long 
as you credit the authors, but you can’t change the article in any way or use it commercially. More 
information and the full terms of the licence here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 




FROM INJUSTICE TO ACTION: THE ROLE OF EMPATHY AND PERCEIVED FAIRNESS 






Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale et Cognitive 
Université Clermont Auvergne 
 
Shelley McKeown 
School of Education 
University of Bristol 
 
Laura Taylor 
School of Psychology 




Please cite as following: Urbanska, K., McKeown, S., & Taylor, L.K. (2019). From injustice to action: 
The role of empathy and perceived fairness to address inequality via victim compensation. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 82, 129-140. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2019.01.010 
 
See Open Science framework project page: https://osf.io/83v4u/ 
 
Corresponding author: Karolina Urbanska, CNRS, Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale et Cognitive, 












Acting prosocially towards others may sometimes involve tangible costs to self, which can be 
associated with lower motivation to help those who have been the victims of injustice. In contrast t 
previous work which suggests that empathy does not shape the perceptions of injustice, the present 
research proposes that while perceptions of fairness in the context of injustice are dynamic, they may 
well be shaped by empathy. Using a dictator-style paradigm, the present research explored the extent
to which empathy is related to perceptions of injustice and in turn, compensating forms of inequality. 
A non-registered Study 1 (N = 466) found that higher empathy predisposition is related to perceiving 
more injustice in contexts of inequality. Preregistered Study 2 (N = 406) extendd this finding by 
experimentally manipulating empathy, showing that emphasising with the victim of inequality is 
indirectly related to perceiving injustice. The hypothesised mechanism, empathy allowing 
identification and experiencing the feelings of anger associated with the injustice, is supported in 
Study 2. As such, perceptions of fairness are not static; empathy is argued to be an important 
mechanism in forming justice perceptions. Data and supplementary materials: [DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/83V4U].  
Highlights 
 Fairness is not about commonly agreed rules but about dynamic judgements 
 Empathy enables individuals to feel what it is like being a victim of inequality 
 Empathy lets individuals to infer anger from the victim and feel anger themselves 
 Increased anger explains why empathy leads to perceiving inequality as more unfair 
 





From injustice to action: The role of empathy and perceived fairness to address inequality via victim 
compensation 
For decades, researchers have been concerned with understanding the conditions under which 
individuals who observe injustice are motivated to engage in prosocial actions to help the victim 




(Eagly & Crowley, 1986; Hoffman, 2008; Small & Simonsohn, 2008). Whilst a number of factors 
have emerged (for a comprehensive review, see Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005), 
empathy appears to be one of the most important predictors of compensatory behaviours (Eisenberg & 
Mussen, 1989), such that individuals who are more empathetic are more likely to help. In other words, 
being able to vicariously experince another person’s emotional state motivates helping behaviours. 
However, when resources are scarce, individuals are more likely to engage in behaviours which 
benefit themselves, rather than help others, and may even blame the victim for their misfortune 
(Lerner, 1980). Therefore, the mechanisms under which individuals act prosocially, to reduce 
inequality at their own expense, are still relatively unknown.  
There is a wide scientific consensus that empathy, described as a disposition to feel a concern 
for victims, increases the likelihood of compensation behaviour in the context of injustice (Leliveld, 
Van Dijk, & Van Beest, 2012). We extend this research by questioning whether empathy directly
influences prosocial behaviour by proposing that empathy may shape what is perceived to be fair in 
the first place. This perceived fairness, in turn, influences the likelihood that people are willing to 
reduce resource inequality at the expense of self-interest. Therefore, the present research t ts the 
assertion that perceived fairness in such situations is ot static or widely agreed but rather, it is 
influenced by the empathetic processing of injustice.  
The Altruism-Empathy Hypothesis 
Children as young as 18 months exhibit predispositions for prosocial behaviours by sharing or 
helping others (Dunfield, Kuhlmeier, O’Connell, & Kelley, 2011). These acts tend to increase in 
complexity and frequency with age (Dunn & Munn, 1986), but what they have in common is that their 
primary aim is to benefit others (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998). Researchers argue that in some cases, 
truly selfless acts of kindness are motivated uniquely by the wellbeing of the affected indivi ual 
(Batson, 1991, 1998). This is often referred to as altruism, a form of prosocial behaviour that is not 
driven by self-interest. Empathy has been identified as fundamental to such behaviours (Eisenberg & 
Mussen, 1989); it requires awareness of others’ states, thoughts, and feelings. Toward this end, 
feelings of empathy are essential for helping those in need (Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978).  




There are competing accounts on the underlying motivations that link empathy and prosocial 
behaviours. On the one hand, some argue that prosocial behaviours are rarely truly altruistic. For 
example, Cialdini and colleagues propose that empathic concern stems from blurring the boundaries 
between the self with the other, such that prosocial behaviours become acts towards oneself (Cialdini, 
Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997). In a series of studies, they demonstrated that feelings of 
sadness, and not empathy itself, motivated prosocial behaviours. Based on these findings, they 
concluded that people have egoistic desires to relieve themselves of the negative emotions (Cialdi i et 
al., 1987). On the other hand, there is an argument against these types of egoistic explanations, 
claiming there is weak evidence that prosocial actions are aimed at reducing one’s own unpleasant 
emotions (Batson, 1991). 
Regardless of the motivations underlying prosocial acts, the impact of carrying out such 
behaviours is arguably positive. Studies demonstrate that the induction of empathy may increase 
helping behaviour in a variety of contexts, even towards stigmatised groups such as drug addicts 
(Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowland, 2002). These experimental studies typically measure prosocial 
behaviours by asking participants to state the extent to which they would help or allocate resources to 
a victim of injustice. There are often discrepancies, however, between intended and actual helping 
behaviours (Vezzali et al., 2015). When asked about intended behaviours, there is often no obvious 
cost to the participant which would prevent them from helping; if anything, helping or other frms of 
compensation may be socially desirable which may decrease confidence in external validity of such 
measures. Dictator-style games, however, developed ways to measure actual prosocial behaviour. 
They typically involve observing a player distribute resources to another passive recipient (see 
McAuliffe, Blake, Steinbeis, & Warneken, 2017 for other types of economic games) and thus, they 
have a potential to measure the real response to an experience of injustice committed against a victim 
within an experimental paradigm.  
Compensating or helping the victim, of course, is not the only way to respond to inequalities. 
Some people may instead choose to punish the perpetrator (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Gromet & Darley, 
2009). The preference for punishment over compensation appears to be stronger in criminal cases, the 




reverse is only observed when the victim is psychologically closer to the person making those 
decisions (van Prooijen, 2010). This finding is supported by laboratory-based evidence, which shows 
that empathy drives both compensation and punishment behaviours but in different ways (Leliveld et 
al., 2012). Namely, highly empathetic individuals address inequality by focusing on the victim and 
compensating them, while low empathetic individuals address inequality by focusing on the 
perpetrator and punishing them. Our primary interest in this research lies in the empathy-driven 
reduction of inequality, so we focus on compensation behaviours only.  
Whilst there is a considerable amount of research that has examined the relationship between 
empathy and prosocial behaviour either via compensation or punishment (Leliveld et al., 2012; Weng, 
Fox, Hessenthaler, Stodola, & Davidson, 2015; Will, Crone, Bos, & Güro銀lu, 2013), to the best of our 
knowledge, researchers have rarely considered whether and how empathy may affect perceived 
fairness of unequal distributions. We aim to address this omission and argue that perceived fairness, as 
opposed to the objective distribution of resources, is central to understanding how empathy affec s 
prosocial behaviours. 
Empathy and Perceived Fairness in Resource Distribution  
Perceived fairness is related to the equal or unequal distribution of resources (for a review, see 
Starmans, Sheskin, Bloom, Christakis, & Brown, 2017) and is central in enabling compensatory 
actions in economic games (Schroeder, Steel, Woodell, & Bembenek, 2003) as well as in applied 
settings such as collective action (van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). That is, a level of 
unfairness needs to be acknowledged in order to motivate individuals to act prosocially. At the same 
time, fairness perceptions are influenced by who the actor is; ne’s own behaviour is typically judged 
as more fair compared to the behaviour of others (Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985). As 
such, standards of fairness are not always applied impartially. Evidence for this assertion comes from 
Lupfer, Weeks, Doan, and Houston (2000), who found that different rules were used to evaluate 
unequal distributions given to the self, compared to a third party. More specifically, the authors 
concluded that when a third party receives unequal outcomes, people are more likely to use 
distributive justice rules to evaluate the situation (e.g., was the outcome even?), but when the 




individuals themselves are the recipients of the same unequal outcome, they are more likely to utilise
procedural justice rules (e.g., how was the decision about the outcome made?). Thus, by emphasising 
different fairness rules for the self versus the other, participants may arrive at a divergent 
understanding of what is fair in response to the same unequal outcome.  
Furthermore, in intergroup contexts, groups judge rules that favour their own group as more 
fair than rules that favour the outgroup (Platow, Hunter, Branscombe, & Grace, 2014) and judge harsh 
behaviour towards an outgroup as more fair than if it happened to the ingroup (Radburn, Stott, 
Bradford, & Robinson, 2016). Therefore, the relationship between unequal distributions and its 
perceived fairness is not linear or static; people can accept unequal distributions, as long as they are 
justifiable, but are most adverse to unfair distributions (Starmans et al., 2017). Yet, it is perceptions of 
unfairness that are more vulnerable to subjectivity than perceptions of inequality. This calls for an 
understanding of what factors, other than group membership, may influence perceived fairness. Given 
the links between empathy and prosocial behaviour, and between perceived fairness and prosocial 
behaviour, we argue that empathy may shape perceptions of fairness.  
When deciding how fair a situation is, empathetic concern may influence how a victim’s 
emotions are taken into account. For example, individuals lower in empathy may be more likely to 
detach themselves from the victim and judge fairness from the perspective of an unaffected third-party 
observer (Cialdini et al., 1997). At the same time, those higher in empathy may be more responsive to 
how the victim is feeling, and in turn, and motivated to act based on their perceptions of victim’s 
emotions. Understanding how people arrive at judgements of fairness, therefore, may not be as simple 
as assuming that these judgements are based on a normative understanding of what fairness is or is 
not. We argue that empathy may be a useful lens to understand how perceived fairness is formed and 
how it, in turn, influences compensation behaviours. If individuals who feel greater concern for a 
victim of inequality also perceive a distribution as less fair, compared to those who do not feelc ncern 
for the victim, this challenges the notion that people widely share an understanding of fairness 
(Messick, 1995). In other words, empathy may be related to what is considered fair, even if the 
distributions are clearly equal or unequal. 




Despite these potential links, the hypothesis that empathy may influence how people perceive 
fairness in contexts of inequality has not been thoroughly investigated. Research carried out by 
Leliveld et al. (2012, Study 1) found that those higher in empathy were more likely to compensate the 
victim of inequality than those lower in empathy; when there was no inequality, empathy levels did 
not affect the compensation behaviour. The authors argued that this finding links to previous research 
which demonstrates that equity may be associated with a shared norm of fairness, arguing against the 
idea that empathy may influence how people perceive fairness in contexts of inequality. We argue, 
however, that empathy may inform perceived fairness which, in turn, will influence compensatory 
behaviour, even when this means forgoing self-interest. Following Cialdini et al. (1997)’s reasoning, 
the present research argues that by empathising with the victim, the line between the self and th  other 
becomes blurred. Given that previous research demonstrates that what is considered fair is rarely 
impartial (Lupfer et al., 2000; Messick et al., 1985; Platow et al., 2014; Radburn et al., 2016), we 
argue that perceptions of fairness can be further shaped by empathy for victims of inequality. 
Empathy, as the ability to accurately read others’ emotional states, allows individuals to be responsive 
to injustices directed at another person and to perceive unfairness on their behalf. In other words, 
unfairness may be claimed more readily amongst empathetic individuals in contexts of inequality. 
Conversely, lack of empathy for the victim may prompt emotionally-detached perceptions of fairness. 
In that case, what is considered fair or unfair would be decided with a lesser consideration on how the 
victim of the injustice may feel.  
Present Research  
Our research aims to examine the roles that both empathy and perceived fairness play in 
understanding prosocial behaviours. We test two competing hypotheses regarding the moderating role 
of empathy (Figure 1). First, we consider the model put forward by Leliveld et al. (2012) in which 
empathy moderates the relationship between dictator offer and compensation. Second, we propose a 
moderated mediation model whereby empathy moderates the relationship between dictator offer and 
perceived fairness. To this end, the paper consists of a non-registered study (Study 1) which provides 
an initial test for the primary hypothesis that empathy is related to perceived fairness dep nding on 




whether the dictator offer is more or less equal. The paper also includes a pre-registered study (Study 
2) that manipulates empathy experimentally and assesses the role of emotions underlying empathy-
driven perceived fairness. Given concerns surrounding the external validity of measuring self-reported 
prosocial behaviours, we employ a dictator-style game to investigate the mechanisms underlying third-
parties addressing inequalities.  
 
Figure 1. Comparison of the two models tested in Study 1. (a) Model proposed by Leliveld et al. 
(2012) whereby empathy moderates the relationship between dictator offer and compensation; (b) The 
primary hypothesis: a moderated mediation model whereby empathy moderates the relationship 
between dictator offer and perceived fairness. 
We build our experimental paradigm on previous research carried out by Leliveld et al. (2012; 
Study 1; see also Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004 for a similar paradigm). In this study, participants (Player 
C, the observer) were invited to the laboratory to play a game with two other play s (Player A, the 
dictator, and Player B, the victim) who were allegedly in another room. Participants were told that 
Player A’s (the dictator’s) task was to share one hundred of their coins in 10-coin increments with 
Player B (the victim) in the first round. Participants were informed about the size of th  dictator’s 
offer and, in the subsequent round, could choose to share up to a total of fifty of their wn coins with 
the victim. Participants subsequently rated the fairness of each dictator offer. This procedure was 
repeated in an increasing fashion until participants saw all dictator offers from 0 and 50 coins.  




We extend Leliveld et al.’s (2012) research in multiple ways. First, we make a theoretical 
contribution by examining the hypothesis that empathy shapes perceived fairness. We conceptualise 
fairness as a dynamic concept, influenced by individuals’ experiences and emotional capacity. As 
such, empathising with a victim of injustice can lead to perceiving (in)justice through their eyes, a 
mechanism which underpins compensation behaviour. Second, we offer an additional test of our 
primary hypothesis via a pre-registered study (Study 2), which further examines emotions which, in 
the context of inequality, may explain why high empathisers perceive more unfairness than low 
empathisers. While Study 1 of Leliveld et al. (2012) used a within-group design to manipulate dictator
offer, this could have resulted in anchoring of the subsequent responses in relation to the previous
response; thus, we follow the improved, between-group design in their Study 2. 
Study 1: Non-registered study 
The purpose of Study 1 was to provide initial evidence for the hypothesis that empathy is 
crucial in perceptions of injustice, which in turn, may be associated with higher likelihood to help he 
victim of injustice. The data comes from a larger, longitudinal project on positive youth development.  
Method 
Participants 
Adolescents from Northern Ireland aged 14-15 (N = 466, 50% male, 50% female) participated 
in the study between February and March 20161. The research team visited eight secondary schools 
where the students participated in the study in groups of around 30, during one of their classes. All 
data was self-report and collected online via Qualtrics. There were no exclusions as there was no 
missing data. Students who completed two waves of the study were compensated with a £10 Amazon 
voucher and each of the eight schools received a £100 Amazon voucher. 
 
                                                          
1
 The sample size was determined based on the main independent variable in the study design, i.e., 
whether the school was predominantly Protestant or Catholic as well as whether it was located close to 
an interface area (where Protestant and Catholic areas meet) or not. 




Procedure and Materials 
 Details of all measures as well as the list of variables included as a part of this research ar  
available via Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/83v4u/. 
Empathy. First, participants’ empathy and perspective taking was measured using items from 
Davis' (1980) scale which originally included empathy, perspective taking, and personal distress
subscales. In the present research, only the former two subscales were used. While these subscales 
consisted of 14 items, only items appropriate for adolescents were selected. Participants responded to 
nine items on a seven-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). Both subscales had 
initially poor internal reliability (perspective-taking g = .54, empathy g = .53) which prompted the 
decision to explore the structure of all of the items via factor analysis as a first step in the analytic 
procedure. This resulted in a single measure of empathy comprising five items (g = .67; see Table 1). 
 Dictator Game. The structure of the keep-compensate game largely followed that of Leliveld 
et al. (2012; Study 1). In the online game, participants were told they would observe two pupils from 
other schools in Northern Ireland, Player A (who was the dictator) and Player B (who was the victim), 
playing a game. Participants were told they could keep the money they had at the end of the game, but 
they all were compensated equally in the study. Player A was a recipient of one hundred 10-pence 
coins (i.e., a total of £10, the amount the participants were to be compensated in the longitudinal 
study) and was asked to divide these between themselves and Player B. At this stage, participants were 
assigned to one out of six conditions whereby Player A gave varying amounts of coins to Player B, 
ranging from 0 to 50 coins in 10-pence coin increments (i.e., up to £5) creating six conditions (coded 0 
= 0 coins to 5 = 50 coins); higher scores reflected higher (i.e., more equal) dictator offers. In the 
subsequent round of the game, participants were invited to join the game as Player C. They were given 
fifty 10-pence coins and informed they could either keep all the coins to themselves or give any 
amount in 10-coin increments to Player B. This variable was called compensation, with a higher score 
indicating higher compensation level (0 = no compensation/0 coins; 5 = full compensation/50 coins).  
 
 






Factor loadings for empathy and perspective-taking items.  
 Factor 
  1 
**I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the ‘other person’s’ point of view (R)     
*When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protecting towards 
them 
 .46  
**I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look 
from their perspective 
 .54  
*Other people’s misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal (R)     
**If I’m sure I’m right about something, I don’t waste much time listening to other 
people’s arguments (R) 
    
*When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don’t feel very much pity for 
them 
    
*I am often quite affected by things that I see happen  .50  
**I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both  .64  
**When I’m upset at someone, I usually try to “put myself in their shoes” for a 
while 
 .51  
Note. * = empathy items, ** = perspective-taking items; (R) = reverse-coded. Factor loadings below 
.40 are supressed. Bold items retained as final empathy scale  
 
Perceived Fairness. Finally, following the same order as Leliveld et al., participants were 
reminded of the distribution of coins from Player A (the dictator) to Player B (the victim) and were 
asked to indicate the extent to which they felt that this distribution was fair via three i ems as 
following: “How fair do you think Player A was in the allocation of the coins to Player B?” (1 = very 
unfair, 7 = very fair), “How just do you think Player A was in the allocation of the coins to Player B?” 
(1 = very unjust, 7 = very just) and “How appropriate was the offer?” (1 = very inappropriate, 7 = very 
appropriate). Three items were aggregated; a higher score indicated higher perceived fairness (g = 
.84).  
In summary, the present study differed from Leliveld et al. (2012, Study 1) in two ways. First, 
our study was carried out online in schools rather than in the laboratory. However, evidence suggests
that economic games data collected using crowdsourcing sites is largely similar to that obtained in he 




laboratory, even with low stakes (Amir, Rand, & Gal, 2012). Second, we did not employ the multiplier 
function, whereby the compensation (and, punishment alike) was tripled, as we wanted the 
compensation to be linked to the £10 participants knew they would be receiving following completion 
of the study. Moreover, we were working with adolescents with a range of academic abilities and who 
had limited time to complete a longer questionnaire. We therefore, wanted to decrease the cognitiv  
load in making decisions in the context of this game.  
Results 
Given that females tend to be more prosocial than males (Eisenberg, Miller, Shell, McNalley, 
& Shea, 1991), the gender of the participants was controlled for across the primary analyses. First-
order correlations are presented in Table 2 while the mean and standard deviations of perceived 
fairness and compensation in response to the six dictator offer conditions are presented in Table 3. We 
tested two mediated moderation models to investigate whether (a) empathy moderates the relationship 
between the dictator offer and perceived fairness or (b) empathy moderates the relationship between 
the dictator offer and compensation behaviour, respectively (s e Figure 1).  
Empathy as a Moderator of Dictator Offer-Compensation link. First, a moderated 
mediation analysis was carried out to test the model supported by Leliveld et al. (2012; see Figure 1a) 
while controlling for the effects of gender. The model was tested using PROCESS Model 5 (Hayes, 
2012) with 10,000 bootstrapped samples. Gender as a covariate was not a significant predictor of 
perceived fairness, b = -.03, se = .12, p = .818, but it predicted compensation behaviour with females 
compensating the victims more than males, b = .37, se =.12, p =.002, 95% CI [.14, .61]. A higher 
dictator offer (more equal, 1 SD above the mean) was associated with higher perceived fairness, b = 
.46, se =.03, p <.001, 95% CI [.39, .52] and higher perceived fairness, in turn, was related to lower 
compensation behaviour, b = -.14, se =.05, p =.004, 95% CI [-.23, -.05]. The direct path between 
dictator offer and compensation behaviour was non-significant, b = -.28, se = 1.76, p = .874. Higher 
empathy further predicted higher compensation behaviour, b = .31, se =.12, p =.008, 95% CI [.08, 
.53], but the interaction between dictator offer and empathy was non-significant, b = -.02,se =.04, p 
=.502. In other words, self-reported empathy did not moderate the impact of dictator offer on 




compensation behaviour, providing no support for Leliveld et al. (2012; Study 1); that is, more 
empathetic individuals did not provide greater compensation in response to less equal dictatorsoffers.  
Table 2 
First order correlations (N = 460) 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1. Gender (0 = male, 1 = female)   —  -.01  -.02  .20 *** .31 *** 
2. Dictator offer      —  .54 *** -.14 ** .03  
3. Perceived fairness         —  -.20 *** -.01  
4. Compensation            —  .22 *** 
5. Empathy               —  
 Note. **p < .01, *** p < .001  
 
Table 3 
Mean and standard deviation in parenthesis of perceived fairness and compensation in response to the 
six dictator offer conditions 
 
Note. a = scale 1-7; b = scale 0-5  
Empathy as a Moderator of Dictator Offer-Fairness link. Second, our primary hypothesis 
(see Figure 1b) was tested in a moderated mediation using PROCESS Model 7 (Hayes, 2012) with 
10,000 bootstrapped samples. Compensation was entered as the outcome variable, dictator offer as the 
predictor variable, perceived fairness as the mediator and empathy as the moderator of the relationship 
between dictator offer and perceived fairness (see Figure 2). Gender as a covariate was not a 
significant predictor of perceived fairness, b = .05, se = .12, p = .671, but it predicted compensation 
behaviour such that females compensated the victims with more coins than males, b = .50, se .11, p 
<.001, 95% CI [.28, .73].  
Dictator offer N Perceived fairness a Compensation b 
  0 x 10p 69 2.65 (1.03) 1.70 (1.15) 
10 x 10p 70 3.06 (1.20) 1.24 (1.29) 
20 x 10p 81 3.23 (1.00) 1.30 (1.38) 
30 x 10p 83 3.46 (1.23)  .99 (1.19) 
40 x 10p 81 4.05 (1.09) .99 (1.11) 
50 x 10p 81 5.17 (1.43) 1.16 (1.40) 




Dictator offer did not directly predict compensation, b = -.03, se = .04, p = .397 nor perceived 
fairness b = -.28, se = .17, p = .104. However, perceived fairness was related to compensation; the 
fairer the dictator offer was perceived to be, the lower the compensation rate was, b = -.15, se = .05, p 
= .002, 95% CI [-.24, -.06]. Higher empathy, in turn, was associated with lower perceived fairness b = 
-.43, se =.11, p < .001, 95% CI [-.65, -.21]. This was further qualified by an interaction with dictator 
offer, b = .15, se = .03, p <.001, 95% CI [-.08, -.22]. Simple slopes analysis revealed that higher 
empathy was associated with a stronger positive relationship between dictator offer and perceived 
fairness, b = .60, se = .05, p < .001, 95% CI [.51, .69] (see Figure 3). When empathy was lower, the 
relationship remained positive, but the strength of the effect was significantly weaker, b = .32, se = 
.05, p < .001, 95% CI [.23, .41]. In other words, adolescents higher in empathy were more likely to 
perceive lower dictator offer (or the more unequal, qualified as 1 SD below the mean) as more unfair 
than their peers lower in empathy, but they were also more likely to perceive higher dictator offer (or 
the less unequal, qualified as 1 SD above the mean) as more fair than their lower empathy 
counterparts. The overall moderated mediation model was significant, b = -.02, se = .01, 95% CI [-.05, 
-.01], suggesting that perceived fairness mediates the link from dictator offer to compensation 
behaviour; the relationship between dictator offer and fairness, in turn, is moderated by empathy. 
 
 
Figure 2. Moderated mediation model for compensation behaviour in the context of the dictator 
resource distribution. Unstandardised coefficients and standard errors are displayed. Gender was 
entered as a covariate of both perceived fairness and compensation, but it is not illustrated in the figure 
for clarity.  






Figure 3. Perceived fairness of more unequal (1 SD below the mean) and more equal (1 SD above the 
mean) dictator offers, moderated by lower and higher empathy levels. 
Sensitivity Power Analysis. To evaluate whether the design of Study 1 was adequate to detect 
even small effect sizes, we conducted a sensitivity power analysis. Given the complexity of the design, 
the analysis was conducted based on the main moderation pathway of empathy on the relationship 
between dictator offer and perceived fairness. The analysis was conducted in G*Power (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) using the linear multiple regression method. The minimum effect 
size detectable in the present design at 80% power, alpha = .05, N = 466 and with three predictors 
(dictator offer, empathy and the interaction between the two) was Cohen’s f2 = .02 demonstrating that 
our sample was sufficient to detect small effect sizes.  
Discussion 
 Our findings offer initial evidence that the more one empathises with how the victim might 
feel, the higher the perception of injustice when distributions are less equal (lower dictator offers). 
This sense of injustice for highly empathetic participants relates to greater motivation to act against the 
injustice. In contrast to Leliveld et al.’s (2012; Study 1) which found that empathy shapes 




compensation behaviour but not judgements of fairness, the present study shows the opposite pattern 
whereby empathy acts as a moderator for fairness perceptions but not compensation behaviour.  
 Findings from Study 1 therefore, support the notion that empathy and fairness are linked, 
which has important implications for encouraging people to reduce inequality. Observing inequality 
itself is not sufficient to act prosocially; mechanisms underlying how people go from witnessing 
inequality to taking action against it need to be theoretically expanded. One way which empathy migh  
influence fairness perceptions is via emotions. We propose that those with a stronger ability to 
understand someone else’s emotions may be more likely to reflect on the victim’s experience and thus, 
perceive the fairness of the decisions more in line with the victim and less like an unaffected third 
party. This theorising is aligned with Cialdini et al. (1997) who posited that the self of an observer 
may become more closely linked to the self of the victim; this observer would then interpret he 
situation as if it happened to them. In this vein, higher empathisers should more readily identify such 
emotions, which would deepen perceptions of unfairness in the case of unequal distributions.  
Evidence demonstrates that experiences of unfairness are associated with a wide range of 
emotions (Cohen-Charash & Byrne, 2008). We focus specifically on anger as there is systematic 
evidence linking it to unfavourable outcomes and unfair procedures (Mikula, Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 
1998; Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano, 1999). Previous research shows that observing others feeling 
angry can trigger a feeling of unfairness without any objective information on the source of angr (v  
Kleef, 2009). And, whilst anger is typically portrayed as a negative emotion associated with a range of 
antisocial behaviours and aggression (e.g., Berkowitz, 1990), it can also motivate others to restore 
equality (Gromet & Darley, 2009; Lotz, Okimoto, Schlösser, & Fetchenhauer, 2011). Anger also tends 
to be triggered by events that are inflicted by another person intentionally (Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, & 
Pope, 1993). While other emotions, such as sadness, happiness (Tan & Forgas, 2010) and guilt 
(Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994), can also be associated with perceptions of (un)fairness 
and wrongdoing, these emotions are not action-oriented i  the way that anger is (Carver & Harmon-
Jones, 2009). In the context of an unfair condition in the dictator game, the dictator chooses to 
distribute the resources unequally, enabling feelings of anger i  the observer on behalf of the victim. 




Feeling higher levels of empathy towards the victim of inequality, therefore, may evoke feelings of 
anger, which in turn, will be associated with higher perceptions of unfairness. Compared to the high-
empathy counterparts, those who are detached from the feelings of the victim would not experience an 
increase in anger and thus, the inequality may be judged as more fair. We hypothesise, then, that 
feelings of anger precede perceptions of fairness; only those who empathise with the victim would be 
able to share an understanding of the emotions associated with inequality. These feelings, in turn, 
would shape the observers’ evaluations of the extent to which the distributions were fair or not. In 
other words, we argue that understanding of victim’s emotions is what drives perceptions of unfairness 
among high empathisers.  
Findings from Study 1 provide an important insight into the role of perceived fairness on 
resource distributions. Our work, however, has some limitations. First, the measure of empathy was 
self-reported with the alpha value falling slightly below the acceptable .70 level, potentially increasing 
measurement error. Second, our correlational assessment of empathy does not allow for establishing 
causation. Third, whilst we found a link between resource distribution and perceived fairnss, we did 
not examine factors such as emotions, which may underlie this relationship. The aim of the pre-
registered Study 2, therefore, was to provide further support for our primary hypothesis that empathy 
shapes people’s perceived fairness regarding resource distribution. To strengthen this evidence, we 
experimentally manipulated empathy. Moreover, we propose that empathy with the victim relates to 
understanding their emotions; therefore, we tested if anger is the mechanism through which 
individuals who empathise with others perceive more unfairness in contexts of inequality. 
Study 2: Pre-registered Study 
In line with Study 1, our primary hypothesis was that there will be a significant interaction 
between dictator offer and experimentally-manipulated empathy on perceived fairness. Compared to 
the low-empathy condition, we predicted that those in the high-empathy condition will rate the 
unequal dictator offer as less fair and the equal dictator offer as more fair. While the unequal dictator 
offer could be perceived as causing harm to the victim and be related to appraising the situation as 
morally wrong (see Schein & Gray, 2017), we expectd that the hypothesised interaction will be 




sustained even when controlling for perceived harm. While it is plausible that by emphasising with the 
victim of inequality may increase the degree to which harm was perceived, we did not expect 
perceptions of harm to diminish the effect on perceptions of fairness. We also aimed to test the 
interaction between the dictator offer and empathy as shown by Leliveld et al. (2012, Study 1), while 
controlling for the effect of perceived fairness. Our secondary hypothesis was that anger will mdiate 
the impact of the interaction between dictator offer and empathy on perceived fairness. That i , 
extending Study 1, we argue that by empathising with the victim, the third party (the participant) will 
more readily experience emotions, specifically anger, on the victim’s behalf in the case of unequal 
distributions. In other words, we propose that anger explains why higher empathy may be associated 
with lower perceptions of fairness in the context of inequality, as opposed to perceptions of unfairness 
leading to anger. We argue that other emotions such as sadness, guilt, or happiness will not be 
responsible for this mechanism, given anger’s approach-motivated profile and its relation t  the 
experience of unfairness.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from Prolific Academic, an online participant recruitment ool, and 
paid £0.60 (equal to €0.68) for eight minutes of their time with a bonus of £1 paid at the end of the 
session regardless of the decision to compensate or not. This additional £1 was related to the number 
of coins participants received to play the game (50 coins worth 2 pence each). Prolific Academic was 
selected as it tends to produce high quality and reliable data (Peer, Samat, Brandimarte, & Acquisti, 
2017). The study was hosted online via Qualtrics (see supplementary materials for the questionnaire 
layout). There were no specific inclusion or exclusion criteria. In terms of the sample size requird to 
detect the hypothesised effect, we focused our estimates on the primary hypothesis. The effect size of 
interaction dictator offer and empathy on perceived fairness in the non-registered Study 1 was small 
(partial n2 = 0.03). Therefore, the a-priori power analysis calculated using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) 
suggests that a sample of N = 342 was needed to obtain this effect in a 2 (dictator offer) x 2 (empathy) 
design with a one covariate (gender) at 90% power and alpha level of 0.05. With an introduction of 




additional controls, we aimed to recruit extra 15 participants per cell, increasing the final sample to 
402 participants. In total, 406 (60% male, 40% female) participants aged between 18 and 74 years old 
(M = 31.91, SD = 11.14) completed the study.  
Procedure and Materials 
The order is which elements of the study are described below corresponds to the running order 
of the study (see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. Running order of Study 2. PF = perceived fairness and harm. 
 
Empathy Manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to either a low-empathy or 
high-empathy condition following the procedures used by Batson et al. (2002). For participants in the 
low-empathy condition, the instructions read as follows: “While you are playing this game, try to take 
an objective perspective toward what is happening. Try not to get caught up in how any player feels; 
just remain objective and detached.” For participants in the high-empathy condition, the instructions 
read as follows: “While you are playing the game, try to imagine how Player B feels about the 
outcomes they receive. Try to feel the full impact of what they may think and how they feel as a 
result.” Previous research has found this type of empathy manipulation to produce large effect sizes 
both in laboratory based and online studies (Batson et al., 2002; Berenguer, 2007; Faulkner, 2018; 
Oceja et al., 2014). 
The Game. To increase participants’ engagement in the game, before the game commenced, 
participants were shown a screen with the message ‘Searching for other players’ along with an 
animated buffering symbol for eight seconds. Following this, the screen changed to ‘All players are 




ready. Please press ‘continue’ to begin the game’. To reduce the number of between-subjects 
conditions from the non-registered Study 1, in Round 1 participants were assigned to one of two (as 
opposed to six) dictator offer conditions whereby Player A (the dictator) shares coins unequally 
(giving 20 of their 100 coins) or equally (giving 50 out of 100 coins) with Player B2. Round 1 was also 
programmed so that Player A took ten seconds to make their decision, after which the screen 
automatically changed. As in Study 1, at the completion of the study, all participants were 
compensated the same amount regardless of their choice to compensate or not to avoid punishing 
those who chose to use their share of allocated coins. 
The following three components were presented in random order to avoid potential order 
effects. 
Perceived Fairness and Perceived Harm. We measured participants’ reaction to the dictator 
offer in Round 1. They rated how fair, just, and appropriate the dictator offer was. Perceived fairness 
was calculated by deriving the mean score of the three items with a higher score indicating higher 
perceived fairness (g = .91). This section also asked participants to judge the extent to which the 
dictator offer was harmful (1 = not at all; 7 = very much). All items were randomly displayed. 
Emotions. Participants also rated the degree to which they felt a range of emotions in relation 
to the dictator offer on a seven-point scale (1 = not at all; 7 = very much). Although we were primarily 
interested in anger, we asked about a number of additional emotions as a concealment, including 
asking if participants felt sad, guilty, and happiness in response to the dictator offer. All emotions were 
randomly displayed. 
Round 2 Compensation. In Round 2, participants were given 50 coins worth 2 pence each. 
Following Leliveld et al.’s Study 2, participants were told that they could either compensate Player B 
by transferring some of their coins or keep all the coins (worth £1) for themselves. The following 
message was displayed: ‘You can give Player B between 1 and 50 coins and the appropriate amount 
                                                          
2 Note that in Leliveld et al. (2012, Study 2) participants saw only the unequal condition. 




will be taken away from your bonus pay of £1.00. If you decide to keep all the coins to yourself, you 
will be paid bonus pay of £1.00 in addition to the £0.60 awarded for participation’. 
Manipulation Check. Following the three previous components, participants were then 
presented with an empathy manipulation check previously utilised by Batson et al. (2002).Participants 
were asked to indicate “While playing the game, to what extent did you concentrate on being 
objective?” and “To what extent did you concentrate on Player B’s feelings?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very 
much). The first item was reversed-scored and the two items were combined into a composite 
“empathy manipulation check” score with a higher score reflecting greater empathy. As a further 
manipulation check, participants were asked “To what extent do you think Player B experienced anger 
in this game?” (1 = not at all; 7 = very much). This was to validate whether those in high-empathy 
condition inferred higher anger from the victim than those in low-empathy condition item (“inferred 
anger manipulation check”). Each manipulation check item was displayed on a new page and the order 
was randomised. 
Demographic Measures. At the end of the experiment, we collectd information on 
participants’ gender and age.  
Results 
For description of planned analyses, see preregistration: https://osf.io/mgexp/. Data and 
analysis code are available via the Open Science Framework project page: https://osf.io/83v4u. Cross-
correlations and descriptive statistics are reported in Tables 4 and 5. 





Bivariate correlations in Study 2 (N=406) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Gender  —  .08  .08  -.07  .03  -.10  -.15 * -.06  -.13  
2. Dictator offer  .09  —  .51 *** .02  .13  -.13  -.21 ** -.11  .29 *** 
3. Perceived fairness  .05  .62 *** —  -.24 *** .16 * -.24 *** -.26 *** -.14 * .56 *** 
4. Perceived harm  -.06  -.33 *** -.41 *** —  .03  .19 ** .22 ** .17 * -.10  
5. Compensation  -.09    .07  <.01   .03   —  -.01  <-.01  -.06  .28 *** 
6. Angry  -.11    -.41 *** -.50  *** .51  *** .03   —  .67 *** .54 *** -.08  
7. Sad  -.05    -.42 *** -.47  *** .50  *** .06   .74  *** —  .57 *** -.08  
8. Guilty  -.05    -.20 ** -.25  *** .31  *** -.16  * .42  *** .32  *** —  .08  
9. Happy  .03    .43 *** .56 *** -.27  *** .01   .32  *** -.36  *** -.08   —  
 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Values for the high-empathy condition are below the diagonal and the low-empathy condition values are above. 
Gender was coded 1 = male, 2 = female and dictator offer was coded 0 = unequal offer, 1 = equal offer.  
 
 




 Table 5 
Mean and standard deviation in parenthesis of the key measured variables in response to the unequal 
and equal dictator offers across low- and high-empathy conditions 
Dictator offer Empathy Perceived fairness Perceived harm Compensation Anger 
Unequal  Low  4.07 (1.24)  2.11 (1.33)  12.60 (10.60)  1.91 (1.32)   
   High  3.81 (1.29)  2.53 (1.60)  15.80 (11.50)  2.48 (1.61)   
Equal  Low  5.57 (1.28)  2.17 (1.74)  16.20 (14.90)  1.58 (1.19)   
   High  5.78 (1.24)  1.55 (1.10)  17.60 (15.30)  1.31 (.82)   
 
Manipulation Check 
Contrary to our expectations and Baston et al.’s (2002) previous research, the two empathy 
manipulation check items, being objective and concentrating on Player B’s feelings, were not related 
to one another, r(404) = -.09, p = .066. Given this, we deviated from the original analysis plan to 
combine these items, and instead entered them separately into the 2 (Dictator Offer: 20 vs 50) x 2 
(Empathy Condition: low vs high) between groups ANOVA analysis. For both items, there was no 
main effect of dictator offer [objectivity: F(1, 404) = .04, p = .846, さp2 < .01; concentration on feelings: 
F(1,404) = 2.09, p =.149, さp2 = .01]. In the high-empathy condition, participants were more likely to 
report that they concentrated on Player B’s emotions during the game (M = 2.96, SD = 1.85) compared 
to those in low-empathy condition (M = 4.94, SD = 1.76), F(1, 404) = 122.02, p <.001, さp2 = .23. 
However, when comparing across empathy conditions, participants did not differ in their reported 
levels of objectivity in the game, F(1, 404) = 1.73, p = .189, さp2 < .01.  
In the same ANOVA model, we included inferred anger to verify whether participants in the 
high-empathy condition were more likely to infer anger from Player B than those in the low-empathy 
condition. There was a significant interaction of Dictator Offer x Empathy on inferred anger, F(1, 401) 
= 4.18, p = .042, さp2 =.01. That is, participants in the low-empathy condition who observed an unequal 
offer perceived Player B to experience the same level of anger as those who observed an equal offer, 
t(201) = 1.69, p = .092, d = .24. In the high-empathy condition, however, participants who observed an 




unequal offer inferred more anger from Player B (M = 3.67, SD = 1.73) than those who observed an 
equal dictator offer (M = 2.52, SD = 1.82), t(201) = 4.62, p <.001, d =.65. 
These analyses suggest that while participants in the high-empathy condition reported to 
concentrate more on Player’s B emotions than participants in the low-empathy condition, they did not 
report staying more objective. The self-reported focus on Player’s B findings was further 
demonstrated by the finding that participants in the low-empathy condition did not infer mor  anger 
from Player B in unequal and equal dictator offer conditions, while those in the high-empathy 
condition judged Player B to experience more anger in the unequal offer condition. While not meeting 
our expectations in full, the difference in reported concentration on Player B’s feelings offers some 
support for our empathy manipulation and allows for proceeding to the subsequent analyses. 
Perceived Fairness 
 To evaluate the effect of the Dictator Offer x Empathy interaction on perceived fairness, 
another ANOVA test was conducted, controlling for the effects of gender. Gender as a covariate was  
non-significant predictor of perceived fairness, F(1,405) = 3.44, p =.064, さp2 = .01. Dictator offers that 
were unequal (M = 3.93, SD = 1.27) were perceived as significantly more unfair than those that were 
equal (M = 5.67, SD = 1.26), F(1, 405) = 191.84, p < .001, さp2 =.33, while the main effect of the 
empathy condition was non-significant, F(1, 405) = .07, p = .794, さp2 < .01. The hypothesised Dictator 
Offer x Empathy on perceived fairness interaction was significant, F(1, 405) = 4.08, p = .044, さp2 =.01. 
The direction of the interaction effect was identical to that reported in Study 1, however, post-hoc t-
tests revealed a non-significant effect of the empathy condition on perceived fairness in both unequal, 
t(201) = 1.45, p = .149, d = .20, and equal dictator offer conditions, t(201) = -1.19, p = .234, d = .17.
Thus, while the interaction was significant, we did not replicate its previously reported effect size. 
Furthermore, when controlling for perceptions of fairness in the model, Dictator Offer x Empathy 
interaction on perceived fairness was non-significant, F(1, 405) = 1.05, p =.306, さp2 < .01. 
Compensation Behaviour 




 Next, we proceeded with testing whether the Dictator Offer x Empathy interaction had a 
significant effect on compensation behaviour (the number of coins given). In contrast to Study 1, 
participants in the equal dictator offer condition compensated at a higher rate (M = 16.83, SD = 15.10) 
than those in the unequal dictator offer condition (M = 14.35, SD = 11.21), F(1, 405) = 4.06, p = .045, 
さp2 =.01. The main effect of empathy, F(1, 405) = 3.19, p = .075, さp2 = .01, and the Dictator Offer x 
Empathy interaction, F(1, 405) = .52, p = .472, さp2 < .01, however, were non-significant. When 
perceived fairness was added as a covariate in the model, it was not related to compensation 
behaviour, F(1, 405) = .31, p = .580, さp2 < .01, and thus, it did not alter the pattern of results with all 
main and interaction effects remaining non-significant. Therefore, the measures employed in the 
present study could not reliably predict compensation behaviour, contrary to previous research 
utilising dictator games. 
The Role of Experienced Anger 
Following the test of the Dictator Offer x Empathy interaction on perceived fairness, we 
proceeded with testing our hypothesis on whether experienced anger can explain the effect of empathy 
across dictator offer conditions on perceived fairness. We entered our variables of interest into a 
moderated mediation model using Hayes’ (2007) PROCESS Model 7 with 10,000 bootstrap samples 
and gender as a covariate. Gender as a covariate was not a significant predictor of perceived fairness, b 
= .13, se = .12, p = .267, but it predicted experienced anger such that males reported higher levels of 
anger than females, b = -.32, se =.12, p =.013, 95% CI [-.58, .07].  
Equal (versus unequal) dictator offer directly predicted higher levels of perceived fairness, b = 
1.53, se = .12, p < .001, 95% CI [1.28, 1.78], but not experienced anger, b = -.31, se = .18, p = .087. 
Higher experience of anger, however, was strongly related to lower perceptions of fairness, b = -.28
se = .05, p < .001, 95% CI [-.37, -.18]. Participants in the high-empathy (versus low-empathy) 
condition reported higher anger b = .61, se =.18, p = .001, 95% CI [.25, .97]. This main effect of 
empathy condition was further qualified by an interaction with dictator offer, b = -.89, se = .25, p 




<.001, 95% CI [-1.39, -.39]3. Figure 5 shows a boxplot distribution of experienced anger scores across 
dictator offer and empathy conditions. We employed simple slope analysis to verify the nature of this 
interaction.  
 
Figure 5. Experienced anger in unequal and more equal dictator offers in low and high empathy 
conditions. Those empathising with the victim experienced anger when the dictator’s distribution was 
unequal.  
In the high-empathy condition, there was a stronger relationship between dictator offer and 
feelings of anger; namely, the unequal dictator offer caused higher experiences of anger than the equal
dictator offer, b = -1.20, se = .18, p <.001, 95% CI [-1.55, -.84]. In the low-empathy condition, the link 
between dictator offer and experience of anger was non-significant, b = -.31, se = .18, p =.087, 
suggesting that participants in that condition were not more angered by the unequal offer than those 
who were shown an equal offer. Breaking down the interaction to compare participants in unequal and 
equal dictator offer conditions, the difference between participants in the low- and high-empaty 
conditions was non-significant when the dictator offer was equal, b = -.28, se = .18, p =.115. However, 
                                                          
3 In exploratory analyses, we also included perceived harm as a covariate. This interaction remained significant, 
b = -.61, se = .24, p =.014, 95% CI [-1.09, -.12]. 




when the dictator offer was unequal, participants in the high-empathy condition experienced more 
anger than participants in low-empathy condition, b = .61, se = .18, p =.001, 95% CI [.25, .96].  
The overall moderated mediation model was significant, b = .25, se = .09, 95% CI [.10, .44], 
suggesting that anger mediates the link from dictator offer to perceived fairness; the relationship 
between dictator offer and anger, in turn, is moderated by empathy (see Figure 6). This pattern 
resembles the results reported in Study 1 relating to perceived fairness as the lowest levels of fairness 
were reported by high empathisers in the unequal dictator condition and the highest levels of anger in 
Study 2. Therefore, the Dictator Offer x Empathy interaction on perceived fairness is an indirect one, 
fully mediated by increased feelings of anger. 
 
 
Figure 6. Moderated mediation model for perceived fairness in the context of the dictator resource 
distribution. Empathising with the victim in context of unequal offer is associated with higher anger, 
which predicts lower perceptions of fairness. Unstandardised coefficients and standard errors are 
displayed. Gender was entered as a covariate of both experienced anger and perceived fairness, but it 
is not illustrated in the figure for clarity.  
Anger or Other Emotions? 
 Finally, we examined whether anger is a unique emotion experienced in contexts of inequality 
for those in the high-empathy condition by comparing anger effects with other emotions. To test this
assertion, self-reported anger, sadness, guilt, and happiness were entered as outcome variables into a 2 
(Dictator Offer: 20 vs 50) x 2 (Empathy Condition: low vs high) between groups ANOVA analysis. 




While the levels of these emotions did not differ across empathy conditions, F(1, 405) < 3.18, p > 
.075, さp2 >.01, participants reported different emotions depending on whether they observed an unfair 
or an equal distribution. Specifically, participants observing an unequal dictator offer reported higher 
anger, sadness and guilt, as well as lower levels of happiness, than those observing the equal dictator 
offer. As reported earlier, there was an interaction between dictator offer and empathy was observed in 
the case of anger, F(1, 405) = 12.21, p = .001, さp2 =.03, and also an interaction for sadness, F(1, 405) = 
8.06, p = .005, さp2 =.02, but not for any of the other emotions.  
Exploratory Analyses 
The Role of Sadness. As we did not expect a significant interaction between Dictator Offer 
and the Empathy Condition on experienced sadness, we probed this effect to uncover its nature. When 
the dictator offer was equal, participants across the low- and high-empathy conditions did not differ in
their levels of sadness, t(199.210) = .98, p = .328, d = .18. When the dictator offer was unequal, 
however, participants in the high-empathy condition reported experiencing higher levels of sadness (M 
= 2.76, SD = 1.68) than those in the low-empathy condition (M = 2.19, SD = 1.68), t(200.42) = 2.55, p 
= .011, d = .36, mirroring the results on experienced anger.  
Given that perceived harm was a relevant variable in the Dictator Offer x Empathy interaction 
on perceived fairness, we re-analysed the effect of this interaction on all emotions, entering perceived 
harm as a covariate. After controlling for perceived harm, the interaction of Dictator Offer x Empathy 
on sadness was no longer significant, F(1, 405) = 3.08, p = .080, さp2 = .01, but it remained significant 
for anger, F(1, 405) = 6.05, p = .014, さp2 = .02. Thus, anger, more than any other emotions appeared to 
account for the effect of empathising with the victims of inequality. 
Other Predictors of Compensation Behaviour. Given that dictator offer, empathy and 
perceived fairness did not influence compensation behaviour, we explored whether compensation 
behaviour was related to any of the manipulation check items. While there was no relationship 
between staying objective and compensation behaviour r(405) = -.03, p =.604, higher levels of 




compensations were related to greater concentration on Player B’s feelings, r(404) = .36, p < .001 and 
lower inferred anger from Player B, r(405) = -.34, p < .001.  
Discussion 
 The findings of our pre-registered Study 2 provide further evidence that in contexts of 
inequality, empathy may be the key mechanism through which people experience anger on behalf of 
the victim, which in turn shapes perceptions of fairness. The results show that those in the high-
empathy condition not only experienced more anger for the victim of inequality, but they also inferred 
more anger from the victim compared to those in the low-empathy condition. Higher experienced 
anger, in turn, was related to lower perceptions of fairness. These findings suggest that empathy 
enables experiencing emotions on behalf of the victim of inequality and that anger is strongly related 
to perceptions of fairness. In contrast to our expectations, levels of compensation were not 
significantly different across empathy conditions, nor they were related to perceived fairness in thi  
study, in contrast to Study 1. Exploratory evidence linked higher levels of compensation to reporting 
the self-reported concentration on their feelings, but contrary to one would assume, participants 
compensated more when they inferred that Player B experienced less anger. Given that these analyses 
were post-hoc, we are not sure why inferring more anger felt by Player B would necessarily be related 
to lower compensation across all experimental conditions.  
We were unable to replicate compensation patterns based on the experimental conditions, in 
contrast to Leliveld et al. (2012) and other literature in this area (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Weng et al., 
2015; Will et al., 2013). Although we did not necessarily expect experimental conditions to influence 
compensation behaviour after controlling for perceived fairness, our findings demonstrate that 
compensation behaviour was not significantly related to perceived fairness. In other words, perceiving 
the dictator offer to be unfair did not motivate people to compensate the victim, even if in the high-
empathy condition where participants reported paying attention to victim’s feelings more than those in 
the low-empathy condition. There are many reasons why this may be the case. The dictator game, 
although being conducted online, had a high validity as it disguised the experiment as a game between 




other participants. The potential problem, however, could have been that the stakes were relatively 
high for the participants to act in self-serving ways as they could earn almost double of their base 
payment. Despite assessing the unequal dictator offer to be significantly more unfair that the equal 
dictator offer, people were not necessarily more likely to compensate victims of inequality at  higher 
level. This suggests that appraisal processes and action to restore inequality were not connected in th  
current study. The size of the stake can certainly be an important factor; this may need further 
investigation as most of the research using dictator games points to clear links between dictator offer 
and compensation behaviours (see Amir, Rand, & Gal, 2012). It is also possible that given the option, 
participants could have restored inequality, for example, by punishing the dictator (e.g., Fehr & 
Gächter, 2002; Gromet & Darley, 2009; Lu & McKeown, 2018), something that was not addressed in 
the present research.  
General discussion 
Building on the work by Leliveld et al. (2012), the present research aimed to examine the roles 
of fairness and empathy in predicting compensatory behaviours, even when this means forgoing self-
interest, in a dictator-style game. We argued that the way people arrive at their judg ments regarding 
fairness is not universal, but that it is shaped by empathy. We found initial support for this hypothesis 
in the non-registered Study 1 where it was shown that higher empathy was related to lowerlevels of 
perceived fairness in unequal distributions, which in turn was associated with how likely the 
individuals compensated the victims of injustice. Pre-registered Study 2 partially replicated these 
findings and experimentally manipulated empathy. Firstly, although those who were in the high 
empathy condition did not directly perceive the dictator offer to be more unfair than those in the low
empathy condition, they were more likely to experience anger on behalf of the victim, which was 
related to lower levels of perceived fairness. This indirect effect, even in the absence of the direct 
effect, generally provides a strong evidence for the hypothesis if it is theory driven as in the case of the 
present research (Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Petty, 2011). Further to this, those in the high-
empathy condition who witnessed an unequal dictator offer in Study 2 more readily inferred that the 




victim felt angry and also experienced anger themselves when compared to those in the low-empathy 
condition.  
Our research findings are in line with the work of Cialdini et al. (1997) who argued that 
empathy enables the self of an observer to become more closely linked to the self of the victim, 
allowing them to share emotions and allowing third-party individuals to interpret events as if it 
happened to them. Our research adds to this understanding, showing that by sharing anger, individuals 
are also more likely to shift their understanding of what is considered fair or unfair. Conseque tly, the 
present research supports the notion that perceptions of fairness are not objective (i.e., unequal 
distributions are not always unfair and equal distributions always fair) but are embedded in context 
(Platow et al., 2014; Radburn et al., 2016). This is in contrast with Study 1 by Leliveld et al. (2012) 
which suggested that empathy shapes the compensation behaviour, but not judgements of fairness. We 
argue that the more one can put themselves into another person’s position, the more likely they are to 
perceive injustice through their eyes, which in turn may increase their motivation to act agains the 
injustice. This contributes to research suggesting that people perceive fairness for self ve sus others 
distinctly (Lupfer et al., 2000; Messick et al., 1985) and to the literature examining the interplay 
between justice and empathy (Blader & Tyler, 2002).  
Implications, Limitations, and Future Directions 
 The present work has important implications for how people may be encouraged to stand up to 
injustices faced by others. Both the present research and that carried out by Leliveld et al. (2012) 
suggest that empathy is an important variable in reacting to inequality. Despite no consensus regarding 
whether empathy can trigger mechanisms towards compensating behaviour, the present research 
shows that empathising with others increases one’s sensitivity to victim’s emotions and by increasing 
one’s levels of anger, and to some extent sadness, it can be the key mechanism explaining why there 
are divergences in whether inequalities are perceived to be fair or not. Appraising inequalities as unfair 
is the first step towards creating motivations to act against them. As such, providing people with 
empathy training may equip them with the necessary skills to civically engage and strive towards 




reducing inequality in the societies they live in, especially as there is evidence that such training is 
successful (Leiberg, Klimecki, & Singer, 2011). 
Despite these implications, there are some limitations of the present research. First, whilst an 
experimental design allows capturing of cause and effect, a dictator style game is arguably somewhat 
removed from the seriousness of injustices experienced in the real world. Indeed, not receiving a fair 
share of coins may not come close to real-life structural inequalities, but nonetheless it is a firs step 
towards understanding what can motivate people to help others even at their own expense. For this 
reason, understanding the impact of stakes of reducing inequality at a cost to one’s self is an important 
avenue of research that should be pursued to understand when perceived fairness leads to 
compensation behaviour. 
Second, the empathy manipulation used in the pre-registered Study 2, whilst previously tested 
(Batson et al., 2002; Berenguer, 2007; Faulkner, 2018; Oceja et al., 2014) did not work as expected as 
participants in the current study who were in the low-empathy condition did not remain more objective 
in the game, compared to those in the high empathy condition, evidenced through the manipulation 
check.  It may be that the manipulation did not necessarily prevent those in the low-empathy condition 
from empathising with the victim of inequality. Thus, while the partial replication of our previous 
results provides some assurance regarding the manipulation, these findings should be taken with 
caution.  
Third, it is important to acknowledge that our hypothesised and tested model may not be the 
only model that explains individuals’ evaluations of fairness. One could argue for a moral 
underpinning of this effect, given that perceived harm appeared to be a relevant factor in shaping 
perceived fairness. Or, perceived fairness could well be construed as preceding anger rather than being 
an outcome of anger. While empathy and inequality were both manipulated in Study 2, evidence 
regarding the role of anger on perceived fairness rests on mediation tests, limiting the ability to 
establish causality. Having said that, best practices recommendations regarding the use of mediati n 
models were followed in the present research (see Fiedler, Harris, & Schott, 2018). Namely, the role 
of experienced anger was theoretically grounded (and pre-registered) and we considered other 




mediation pathways via alternative emotions, permitting rigorous and comprehensive hypothesis 
testing.  
An important extension of the dictator game methodology in this area of research, particularly 
contexts troubled by intergroup conflict, would be to address how empathy may affect perceptions of 
fairness in contexts of inequality across group boundaries. For example, under which circumstances 
could empathy enable individuals to feel anger on behalf of the outgroup member and thus, condemn 
the actions of the ingroup member in clear-cut contexts of inequality? Understanding these 
mechanisms is crucial for empowering people to be active citizens in their communities, calling out 
injustices, and mobilising themselves to overcome unjust inequalities.  
In conclusion, the present research demonstrates that fairness is not necessarily a commonly 
agreed set of norms; instead, empathising with those in need allows individuals to experience their 
situation more deeply through the emotions they experience. Understanding that such circumstances 
produce feelings of anger allows third-party onlookers to perceive those circumstances as more unfair. 
Those who do not empathise, on the other hand, may not be plagued by the same sense of unfairness. 
These findings point to fairness as a dynamic concept as opposed to a passive one. Uncovering what 
strikes individuals as unfair is at the heart of making others more open to act in less selfish ways. 
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